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Abstract
We introduce ‘Causal Information Contribution (CIC)’
and ’Causal Variance Contribution (CVC)’ to quantify
the influence of each variable in a causal directed acyclic
graph on some target variable. CIC is based on the un-
derlying Functional Causal Model (FCM), in which we
define ‘structure preserving interventions’ as those that
act on the unobserved noise variables only. This way, we
obtain a measure of influence that quantifies the contri-
bution of each node in its ‘normal operation mode’. The
total uncertainty of a target variable (measured in terms of
variance or Shannon entropy) can then be attributed to the
information from each noise term via Shapley values. CIC
and CVC are inspired by Analysis of Variance (ANOVA),
but also applies to non-linear influence with causally de-
pendent causes.
1 Introduction
Quantification of causal influence not only plays a role
in expert’s research on specific scientific problems, but
also in highly controversial public discussions. For in-
stance, the question to what extent environmental factors
versus genetic disposition influence human intelligence, is
an ongoing debate [1]. Given the relevance of these ques-
tions, there is surprisingly little clarity about how to de-
fine strength of influence in the first place, see e.g. [2],
apart from the problem of estimating it from empirical
data after it is properly defined. More recent discussions
on feature relevance quantification in explainable artifi-
cial intelligence has raised the problem of quantification
of influence once more, see e.g. [3, 4, 5].
Probabilistic versus functional causal models Our
language for talking about causal relations will be based
on Pearl’s seminal work [6].
Definition 1 (Causal Bayesian Network). A causal
Bayesian network is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) G
whose nodes are random variablesX1, . . . , Xn with joint
distribution PX1,...,Xn satisfying the Markov condition
with respect toG: Each nodeXj is conditionally indepen-
dent of its non-descendants NDj , given its parents PAj
and thus the joint probability factorizes according to
p(x1, . . . , xn) =
n∏
i=1
p(xi|pai). (1)
Apart from this purely statistical condition (which may
hold for many DAGs other than the causal one), G de-
scribes the behaviour of the system under interventions
in the following sense. If one sets the parents PAj of a
node Xj to some values paj , Xj will then be distributed
according to PXj |PAj=paj .
While Bayesian networks can also be used to formalize
statistical conditional (in)-dependences between random
variables without causal interpretation, the last condition
in Definition 1 clarifies that the DAG is causal because
for a general set of variables statistically related to Xj ,
setting them to certain values does not result in the same
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distribution as observing them to attain these values (dif-
ference between interventional and observational condi-
tionals, see [6]). A more ‘fine-grained’ causal model is
given by functional causal models, also called non-linear
structural equation models:
Definition 2 (Functional Causal Model). An FCM is a
DAGGwith observed variablesX1, . . . , Xn as nodes and
N1, . . . , Nn as unobserved noise variables such that
(1) Each Xj is deterministically given by its parents and
the noise term, that is,
Xj = fj(PAj , Nj), (2)
and
(2) all noise variables are jointly statistically indepen-
dent. Moreover, (2) is not just an equation, but a causal
assignment in the sense that for any particular observed
value xj of Xj , setting PAj to pa
′
j instead of paj would
have changed xj = fj(paj , nj) to x
′
j = fj(pa
′, nj) (if
nj denotes the value attained by Nj for that particular
statistical instance).
The existence of an FCM implies that PX1,...,Xn sat-
isfies the Markov condition with respect to G [6]. On
the other hand, every joint distribution that is Marko-
vian relative to G can be generated by an FCM, but
this construction is not unique. This is because know-
ing the causal DAG and the joint distribution alone does
not determine counterfactual causal statements like1 ‘how
would xj have changed, had I set PAj from paj to pa
′
j’.
While the more ‘conventional’ approaches to causal dis-
covery infer the graphical model [8] from conditional sta-
tistical independences (up to Markov equivalence), more
recent approaches based on other properties of the joint
distribution infer the DAG by inferring FCMs [9, 10],
subject to strong additional assumptions. This allows us
to draw counterfactual conclusions from empirical data
which could not be inferred otherwise.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes
via intuitive examples which notion of causal influence
we have in mind. Section 3 defines our quantification
of causal influence in the sense of information contribu-
tion. Section 4 introduces causal influence in the sense
of contribution to the variance, which we mention be-
cause it comes with advantages for some practical appli-
1See also [7] for an explicit description of the non-uniqueness.
cations, although the main focus of the paper is informa-
tion theoretic in oder to admit applicability to variables
with general range. Then we discuss some properties of
both contribution measures in Section 5. Section 6 dis-
cusses earlier measures of causal influence that are also
information-based and compares it to ours.
The main goal of the present paper is to show the so-
phistication of the problem of quantifying causal influ-
ence. Even if one agrees to base notions of causal influ-
ence on interventions in causal DAGs; and even if one
decides to measure its strength in terms of Shannon in-
formation, there are still substantially different notions
of causal strength. We argue that these different notions
coexist for good reasons, since they formalize different
ideas on what causal influence is about. Although the pa-
per is purely theoretical, the main contribution is not a
mathematical one. Instead, it aims at motivating a defi-
nition of influence, exploring whether it aligns with intu-
itive human concepts (by example stories), and critically
discussing its limitations.
2 Motivation: influence in the sense
of contribution
Assume three authors A,B,C are jointly writing a docu-
ment. A writes the first section, passes it to B who writes
the second section and passes it to C. Finally, C adds
the third section. Let DA, DB, DC denote the documents
after A,B,C contributed their sections SA, SB, SC , re-
spectively. We visualize the underlying communication
scenario by the causal DAG
DA → DB → DC .
To judge how much each author ‘influenced’ the result-
ing documentDC we could argue in at least two different
ways:
1. Influence in the sense of contribution: each author
contributed his/her section.
2. Influence in the sense of options for actions: au-
thor A had an influence on section SA, author
B on sections SA, SB, while author C influenced
SA, SB, SC . After all, they also saw the sections of
the authors contributing earlier and thus could have
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changed them drastically. Assume, for instance, au-
thor C realizes that SA is complete non-sense. Then
C may not only blame A for having written it but
also B for not correcting it. In this sense, author
A had the smallest influence because he/she could
only influence SA, author B could have influenced
(SA, SB) and author C even (SA, SB, SC).
To describe the difference of these two interpreta-
tions quantitatively, we now consider a statistical sce-
nario where the three authors repeatedly write documents
following the same communication scenario above and
we consider SA, SB, SC as independent random variables
with Shannon entropy H(SA), H(SB), H(SC), respec-
tively (since we argue in terms of information theory,
SA, SB, SC may attain values in arbitrary sets, e.g., in the
set of texts of finite length). We then define the FCM
DA := SA (3)
DB := (DA, SA) (4)
DC := (DB, SC), (5)
where (, ) denotes the concatenation of texts. Assume we
like to quantify the influence of each author on the final
document DC in terms of Shannon mutual information
[11].
For the influence of each author on DC in the sense of
contribution we get
Contribution(A) := I(SA : DC) = H(SA)
Contribution(B) := I(SB : DC) = H(SB)
Contribution(C) := I(SC : DC) = H(SC).
On the other hand, let us measure the influence in the
sense of ‘options to change’, or ‘potential influence’ by
quantifying the amount of information that each author
has seen and could therefore have changed.2 Accordingly,
we consider an experiment where each author randomizes
not only his/her section but also replaces the sections that
already exist with random inputs from the corresponding
2One may certainly argue that authors A and B would have had the
option to write also the sections following theirs, but this ‘potential in-
fluence’ breaks the protocol even more drastically.
distribution. We then obtain
Opt(A) := I(DA : DC) = H(SA)
Opt(B) := I(DB : DC) = H(SA) +H(SB)
Opt(C) := I(DC : DC) = H(SA) +H(SB) +H(SC).
To elaborate on the difference between both notions
of influence, one could say that the first one accounts
for the influence in a somehow ‘normal mode’, an influ-
ence that respects the mechanisms given by the structural
equations (3) to (5), while the second notion assumes a
radical change of the mechanisms that blocks the depen-
dence from causal parents. Although there are certainly
good reasons for both notions, we will mainly focus on
the first one for two reasons. First, quantification of causal
influence so far has covered this notion the least3. Second,
we believe that influence defined by hypothetical radical
mechanism changes is not what one is interested in for
typical applications. Assume, for instance, one discusses
the factors that influence the revenue of a bank. Follow-
ing the second notion of influence, one could argue that
the person driving the money transporter has a significant
influence because he/she could have stolen a lot of money.
However, a serious economical discussion on the factors
influencing revenue would only account for this case if it
happened with significant probability. Then, however, one
would introduce the loss caused by the money transporter
as an additional noise variable in the corresponding struc-
tural equation and again end up at contribution analysis in
the sense of our first notion.
Structure preserving interventions Our remarks
above implicitly refer to actions that do not match the
standard notion of interventions. The interventional
calculus by [6] refers by default to interventions that set
nodes to particular fixed value. This type is formally4
defined by removing fj in (2) and replacing it with
Xj := xj . We will now consider interventions that
preserve the structural equations because they act on
3Note that two substantially different notions of causal influence,
namely Information Flow in [12] and Causal Strength in [13] are related
to Opt rather than to Contribution, see Section 6.
4More general interventions where (2) is replaced with a different
structural equation, are considered by [14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. This certainly
includes the below notion of intervention as a special case.
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the noise only. To see that this notion is substantially
different from the former just consider the case where a
variable is deterministically given by its parents. Then
there is no structure preserving intervention on that node
possible. Accordingly we cannot talk about its influence
on any other node. Following our remarks above, this is
in agreement with the common practice of not attributing
any influence to mechanisms that just transport the
information reliably without any change.
One can think of different types of interventions on
the noise: (1) setting Nj to some specific value, (2) ap-
plying some function g to Nj , that is, Nj → g(Nj). A
quite natural example for real-valued variables is the shift
Nj 7→ Nj+∆ for some∆ ∈ R. Note that it is not allowed
that the operation in the noise depends on the value of the
parents, because this would implicitly mean changing the
structure (such an operation changes the wayXj depends
on its parents).
Below, we consider interventions on the noise that ran-
domize Nj according to the un-intervened distribution
(the usual term ‘observational distribution’ seems out of
place here because Nj is assumed to be unobserved, al-
though they can be computed from observations subject
to assumptions like additive noise as used by [9]). There
are two arguments for this choice. First, it is convenient
that the mutual information that Nj shares with any ob-
served node is then exactly the information the two vari-
ables share in the un-intervened distribution (note that
noise variables are always unconfounded because they
don’t have incoming arrows). This way, we do not need to
explicitly compute interventional distributions via ‘block-
ing back-door paths’ [6]. Second, allowing randomized
interventions with noise distribution different from the
observed introduces would raise the difficult question of
which distribution to use instead. Choosing a distribu-
tion with larger variance, for instance, could influence
downstream variables in a much stronger way than it usu-
ally would. Randomizing with the ‘natural distribution’ is
therefore aligned with our idea of measuring the influence
of a node in the ‘normal mode’ rather than in a scenario
with drastic changes.
X1 X2 X3 · · · Xd
Y
Figure 1: The simple case of multiple causally indepen-
dent causes influencing the target Y .
3 Defining Causal Information Con-
tribution
3.1 Multiple independent direct causes:
To be prepared for general DAGs we first consider the
simple DAG shown in Figure 1, where d independent vari-
ables (X1, . . . , Xd) =: X directly influence a target Y . A
natural information theoretic quantification of causal in-
fluence in this case is given as follows.
For any subset T ⊂ {1, . . . , d} =: U , we defineXT as
the vector containing (Xj)j∈T . The Shannon mutual in-
formation between Y andXT is nonnegative.We then de-
fine the causal information contribution of node j, given
some T not containing j, as the difference
CIC(Xj → Y |XT ) := I(XT∪{j} : Y )− I(XT : Y )
= I(Xj : Y |XT ) ≥ 0, (6)
see [11] for the second equality. Obviously, we can then
decompose the mutual information between Y and all in-
puts as
I(X : Y ) =
d∑
j=1
CIC(Xj → Y |X{1,...,j}). (7)
Unfortunately, the contribution of each node depends on
an arbitrarily chosen order of nodes, which yields an ill
defined value. Shapley values in cooperative game theory
get rid of this dependence by symmetrizing (7) over all
orderings [19]. They are defined as follows:
Definition 3 (Shapley value). Let N be a set with n ele-
ments (called ‘players’ in the context of game theory) and
ν : 2N → R be a set function with ν(∅) = 0 (assigning
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a ‘worth’ to each ‘coalition’). Then the Shapley value of
i ∈ N is given by
ϕi(ν) :=
∑
S⊂N\{i}
|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!
n!
(ν(S ∪ {i})− ν(S))
=
∑
S⊂N\{i}
1
n
(
n−1
|S|
) (ν(S ∪ {i})− ν(S)). (8)
ϕi(ν) is thought of measuring the contribution of each
player in a fair way and satisfies
n∑
i=1
ϕi(ν) = ν(N). (9)
By defining the ‘worth of a coalition of noise terms’ via
ν(S) := I(XS : Y ), we can define the ‘Shapley contri-
bution’ of each node via
CICSh(Xj → Y )
:=
∑
T⊂U\{j}
1
d
(
d−1
|T |
)CIC(Xj → Y |XT ), (10)
which, using (9) still add up to the total information
I(X : Y ) =
d∑
j=1
CICSh(Xj → Y ).
Interpretation as reduction of uncertainty: Note that
CIC(Xj → Y |XT ) can also be interpreted as measuring
to what extent the uncertainty of Y is reduced by knowing
Xj on top of XT . This is because the conditional mutual
information can be decomposed into a difference of con-
ditional Shannon entropies [11]:
CIC(Xj → Y |XT ) = I(Xj : Y |XT ) (11)
= H(Y |XT )−H(Y |XT∪{j}).
Relation to ANOVA: Despite its weaknesses, see e.g.
[20, 21], Analysis of Variance (ANOVA ) is still a popu-
lar measure for quantifying causal contributions5, mainly
thanks to its simplicity. For the DAG in Figure 1 it can in-
deed be though to measure causal influence subject to the
5also a classical method for quantifying heritability [22]
additional assumption that the influence is linear:
Y =
d∑
j=1
αjXj .
Due to the uncorrelatedness of the causesXj we have
Var(Y ) =
d∑
j=1
α2jVar(Xj).
Accordingly, one can quantify the fraction ofVar(Y ) that
is explained by eachXj :
cj := α
2Var(Xj)/Var(Y ),
which entails
∑d
j=1 cj = 1. If the values of any subset
XT of variables is known, the variance of Y reduces to∑d
j 6∈T α
2
jVar(Xj). Accordingly, we can also interpret cj
as the fraction by which the uncertainty of Y is reduced by
knowing Xj . While above uncertainty was meant in the
sense of entropy, here it is measured in terms of variance.
The rephrasing (11) thus shows that CIC is in the same
spirit as ANOVA, with the difference that the reduction
of uncertainty in the simple linear model of ANOVA does
not depend on which other variables are already known
(and thus ANOVA does not require Shapley values). In
Section 4 we will define Causal Variance Contribution,
which measures uncertainty by variance instead of en-
tropy and a thus literary generalizes ANOVA.
3.2 Definition for general DAGs
FCMs provide an elegant way to reduce the case of a gen-
eral DAG with nodes X1, . . . , Xn to the case in Subsec-
tion 3.1. Let us assume that Xn is the target node we are
interested in and, without loss of generality, that Xn is a
sink node of the DAG (that is, it has no descendants). We
can then recursively insert structural equations (2) into
each other and write Xn entirely in terms of the unob-
served noise variables:6
Xn = Fn(N1, . . . , Nn). (12)
6Note that writing some target variable in terms of all upstream noise
terms seems appears to be a general approach in various types of attri-
bution analysis. It has also been used for root cause analysis of outliers
[23]. More generally speaking, writing the vector X in terms of the in-
dependent noise terms N can be seen as a particularly meaningful type
of non-linear independent component analysis because it is based on a
causal model.
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Therefore, we can think ofXn being the effect of the inde-
pendent causes N1, . . . , Nn. This way, we are back at the
scenario in Figure 1 by replacing the inputs X1, . . . , Xd
withN1, . . . , Nn. Hence, we define our measure of causal
influence accordingly:
Definition 4 (causal information contribution (CIC)). As-
sume we are given variables X1, . . . , Xn whose causal
relation is described by an FCM (2) where Xn is a sink
node. Let Fn as in (12) express Xn in terms of all noise
variables (N1, . . . , Nn) =: N. Then the Causal Informa-
tion Contribution (CIC) of node Xj , given some subset
T ⊂ {1, . . . , n} is given by
CIC(Xj → Xn|T ) := I(Nj : Xn |NT ) (13)
= H(Xn|NT )−H(Xn|Nj ,NT ) (14)
Note that this definition includes the special case
Contr() in Section 2 which has also been defined by the
noise variable in the structural equations (3) to (5). To fur-
ther ‘demystify’ the noise variablesNj in our context, one
may think of a train schedule whereXj formalizes the de-
lay of train j and PAj is the set of all trains that can delay
jth departure because it waits for them. Then, only Nj in
(2) allows us to describe the part of jth delay that is gen-
uinely caused by itself rather than being ‘inherited’ from
other trains. 7
Further note that we decided to writeCIC(·|T ) instead
of CIC(·|XT ) to emphasize that we do not condition on
observations from the random variables XT (as opposed
to (6), where computing CIC really involves conditioning
on observed random variables). Then the Shapley CIC,
denoted by CICSh(Xj → Xn), is defined similarly as in
(3.1) by the weighted averaged over CIC(Xj → Xn|T )
for all conditioning sets T :
CICSh(Xj → Xn) :=
∑
T⊂U\{j}
1
d
(
d−1
|T |
)CIC(Xj → Xn|T ). (15)
The following lower bound can be convenient:
7Note that [24] already argued in favor of using FCMs for causa-
tion, in their case for causation of singular events. However, their notion
of ’contributory cause’ is again based on do(Xj = xj)-interventions
rather than structure-preserving interventions and thus substantially dif-
ferent from our notion of ’contribution’.
Lemma 1 (no information loss by conditioning). For any
sets S ⊃ T we have
CIC(Xi → Xn |S) ≥ C(Xi → Xn |T ).
In particular,
CICSh(Xi → Xn) ≥ CIC(Xi → Xn |∅). (16)
The proof follows easily from I(A : B |C) ≤ I(A :
B |C,D) for any random variables A,B,C,D with A ⊥
D |C.
We observe that I(N : Xn) = H(Xn) (which is infi-
nite for continuous variables8, in which case we propose
to discretize the variables). Hence we obtain
H(Xn) =
n∑
j=1
CICSh(Xj → Xn). (17)
This justifies to consider CICSh as the ‘contribution of
each node to the information ofXn’.
Subsection 5.3 will argue, however, that the sym-
metrization over conditioning sets has also disadvantages.
Depending on the context, one may therefore decide to
also work with ‘plain’ CIC containing the dependence
on the conditioning sets. For many applications one may
also stick toCIC(Xi → Xj |∅), although it is blind to the
influence that gets only apparent after some other noise
terms are known. For a general discussion of this ‘syn-
ergy’ effect in information theory see also [25].
4 Causal Variance Contribution:
The relation to ANOVA mentioned earlier suggests to
measure the uncertainty reduction that results from know-
ing certain noise terms also in terms of variance. In other
word, we obtain an extension of ANOVA in a more literal
sense by replacing the difference of conditional entropies
in (14) with conditional variance:
Definition 5 (Causal Variance Contribution). Let Xn be
a real-valued target variable. Then the Causal Variance
8Note that replacing Shannon information with differential Shannon
entropy does not solve the problem that the mutual information is still
infinite.
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Contribution ofXj onXn, givenXS is defined by
CV C(Xj → Xn |S)
:= Var(Xn|Nj,NS)−Var(Xn|NS).
Likewise, we define Shapley contribution CV CSh(Xj →
Xn) by symmetrization over subsets S as in (15).
CV C reduces to ANOVA for the scenario where is a
linear combination of independent causes, that is,
Xn =
n−1∑
j=1
αjXj .
Then the reduction of conditional variance caused by in-
cludingXj is given by α
2
jVar(Xj).
Quantifying uncertainty in terms of variance rather than
Shannon entropy may be more intuitive for many practi-
cal applications. Further, conditional variance can be bet-
ter estimated from finite data than entropy since (via the
squared error of regression models). Nevertheless, infor-
mation theoretic quantificationwill remain ourmain focus
in order not to allow also for non-real values variables like
categorical ones.
5 Some properties of CIC and CVC
Studying properties of CIC and CVC may help under-
stand in what sense they quantify indirect influence. This
way, the reader may judge him/herself whether it de-
scribes a notion of influence that is appropriate for the
application in mind.
5.1 Inserting dummy nodes
Assume we are given the causal DAG X → Y with the
structural equations
X := NX
Y := fY (X,NY ).
Then, straightforward application of (15) yields
CICSh(X → Y ) =
1
2
(I(NX : Y ) + I(NX : Y |NY )).
(18)
Let us now insert an intermediate node X˜ that is just an
exact copy ofX , that is, we define the modified FCM
X := NX (19)
X˜ := X (20)
Y := fY (X˜,NY ). (21)
The corresponding DAG reads X → X˜ → Y . From a
physicists perspective, such a refinement of the descrip-
tion should always be possible because any causal influ-
ence propagates via a signal that can be inspected right
after it leaves the source. The following result shows that
(19) to (21) entail the same value for CICSh(X → Y ) as
(18) because the ‘dummy’ noise variableNX˜ correspond-
ing to X˜ is irrelevant for the contribution of the other
nodes:
Lemma 2 (dummy noise variables). Let N1, . . . , Nn
be noise variables of an FCM M with observed nodes
X1, . . . , Xn. Let M˜ be a modified FCM with ob-
served variables X1, . . . , Xn+k and noise variables
N1, . . . , Nn+k modelling the same joint distribution on
X1, . . . , Xn, N1, . . . , Nn. Assume that the additional
noise variables Nn+1, . . . , Nn+k are irrelevant for Xj ,
that is
Nn+1, . . . , Nn+k ⊥ Xj |NT , (22)
for all T ⊂ {1, . . . , n}. Then M and M˜ yield the same
values for CICSh(Xi → Xj) and CV CSh(Xi → Xj)
for all i = 1, . . . , n.
First we need the following property of Shapley values:
Lemma 3 (adding zero value players). For N˜ ⊃ N let
ϕ˜ : 2N˜ → R be given by
ϕ˜(S˜) := ϕ(S˜ ∩N),
that is, ϕ is an extension of ϕ to irrelevant elements. Then
ϕi(ν) = ϕi(ν˜) ∀i ∈ N.
We are now able to prove Lemma 2. CICSh is given
by first defining the function
ν(S) := I(NS : Xj),
in Definition 3, for each S ⊂ {1, . . . , n}. ThenCICSh =
φi(ν). Further, define
ν˜(S˜) := I(NS˜ : Xj).
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for each S˜ ⊂ {1, . . . , n + k}. Then, ν˜(S˜) = ν(S˜ ∩
{1, . . . , n}). To see this, set S := S˜ ∩ {1, . . . , n}. Then
we have
I(NS˜ : Xj) = I(NS : Xj)
+ I(NS˜\S : Xj |NS).
The second term vanishes due to (22). Hence, ν˜ defines
an extension of ν to irrelevant elements in the sense of
Lemma 3. Since CICSh(Xi → Xj) with respect to the
extended FCM is given by ϕ˜i(ν˜), the statement follows
from Lemma 3.
To show the same for CV C, we define the set function
ν(S) := Var(Xj |NS) and (22) implies Var(Xj |NS) =
Var(Xj |NS˜).
5.2 Marginalization over grandparents
We are given the causal chain
X → Y → Z, (23)
with the structural equations
X := NX (24)
Y := fY (X,NY ) (25)
Z := fZ(Y,NZ). (26)
Assume now we ignore the variable X and consider the
causal structure
Y → Z, (27)
which is consistent with (23) because X can be thought
of part of the noise term for Y . We would then describe
(27) by the structural equations
Y := N˜Y with N˜Y := fY (NX , NY ) (28)
Z := fZ(Y,NZ). (29)
One can easily see that CICSh(Y → Z) is not the same
as for the larger model. In the limiting case where Y is
just a copy of X we obtain CICSh(Y → Z) = 0 for
(23) while the DAG (27) is blind for the fact that Y has
‘inherited’ all its information from its grandparent. This
matches our explanations on contributions of authors in
Section 2: not being aware of the original source, one
may erroneously attribute all sections to an author who
just added one. The same argument for the deterministic
case applies toCV C because a node without noise cannot
contribute to the variance either.
5.3 Marginalization over intermediate
nodes
While we inserted a deterministic node in Subsection 5.1
we now marginalize over an intermediate node that de-
pends non-deterministically from its cause.9 Let us again
consider the chain (23) with the structural equations (19)
to (21). Recall that CICSh(X → Z) contains the terms
I(NX : Z), I(NX : Z |NY ), I(NX : Z |NZ), I(NX :
Z |NY , NZ).
Marginalizing over Y yields the causal DAG X → Z
with the structural equations
X := NX (30)
Z := f˜Z(X, N˜Z), (31)
where N˜Z := (NY , NZ) and
f˜Z(X, N˜Z) = fZ(fY (X,NY ), NZ).
For the reduced structure,CICSh(X → Z) contains only
terms of the form I(NX : Z) and
I(NX : Z |N˜Z) = I(NX : Z |NY , NZ),
while the terms I(NX : Z |NY ), I(NX : Z |NZ) do not
occur any longer. Hence, the causal information contri-
bution is not invariant with respect to the marginaliza-
tion. The reason is that Shapley symmetrization averages
the relevance of NX over all possible combinations of
background conditions. Reducing the possible combina-
tions by ignoring nodes can result in different values for
CICSh. This may be an argument for using ‘plain’ CIC
which explicitly refers to the set of background variables
under consideration.
One can easily verify that marginalization also affects
CV C for qualitatively the same reasons.
5.4 Dependence on the functional causal
model:
CIC and CV C may differ for different FCMs (with the
same DAG) describing the same joint distribution. For
9Note that consistence of causal structures under various coarse-
grainings is an interesting topic in a more general context too [26].
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X → Y with binary variables X,Y , first consider the
structural equations
X := NX (32)
Y := X ⊕NY (33)
where NX , NY are binary noise variables with NY unbi-
ased. Then we have
CICSh(X → Y ) =
1
2
(I(NX : Y ) + I(NX : Y |NY ))
=
1
2
(0 + 1) = 1/2.
The same joint distribution PX,Y can also be generated
by
X := NX (34)
Y := NY (35)
for which we obtain10
CICSh(X → Y ) = 0.
Again, the same holds for CV C.
Given that the scientific content of causal counterfactu-
als is philosophically controversial one may find this de-
pendence on the specific FCM worrisome. The following
example suggests that this dependence can also be consid-
ered a desirable feature rather a conceptual flaw. Assume
that X,Y stand for the bits of an unencrypted and en-
crypted text, respectively. Let Y be obtained from X by
bitwise XOR with a randomly generated secret key N . If
we have no access to N , we cannot detect any statistical
dependence between X and Y . However, we would not
argue that the author of X did not contribute to Y just
because Y looks the same to us as an encrypted version
of an entirely different text. Merely the knowledge that Y
has been obtained by such a secret encryption of the mes-
sage X would let us claim that X contributed to Y . Our
argument thus follows the justification of counterfactuals
by [6], who does not assume the noise to be unobservable
in principle.
Some readers may not find this argument entirely con-
vincing and still try to measure the ‘information contri-
bution’ of each node on a target in terms of a quantity
10One can easily change the model to more generic parameters if one
dislikes describing independent variables X,Y with the ‘non-minimal’
DAG X → Y .
that refers to observed nodes only, rather than to an un-
derlying FCM. We do not want to exclude that reason-
able notions of indirect influence of this kind could be de-
fined. Knowing Pearl’s interventional calculus [6] and in-
formation theory, it seems natural to compute causal influ-
ence via some information shared by nodes after ‘block-
ing back-door paths’ (to refer to interventional rather than
observational probabilities). As far as we can see, these
attempts fail to formalize our intuitive notion of ‘informa-
tion contribution’, since they have some undesired proper-
ties, despite being reasonable concepts in their own right.
This will be explained in the following section.
6 Previous work on quantifying
causal influence
This paper focuses on information-based quantifications
of causal influence because they apply to variables with
arbitrary range, while measures like Average Causal Ef-
fect [6] – whether they measure direct or indirect in-
fluence [27] –are restricted to numerical variables since
it quantifies the change of an expectation of a variable
caused by changes of its ancestors in the DAG. Below,
we therefore describe previous work only for information-
based quantification of causal influence.
6.1 Information Flow
As pointed out by [12], quantifying causal influence be-
tween observed nodes via the information they share, re-
quires computing information with respect to interven-
tional probabilities rather that information given in a pas-
sive observational scenario (recall that this distinction
has been irrelevant for us since dependences between ob-
served nodes and noise are always causal and uncon-
founded). Accordingly, they define the information flow
from a set XA of variables to another set XB , imposing
that some background variablesXS are set to xS by
I(XA → XB |do(xS)) := (36)
−
∑
xA,xB
p(xB|do(xA,xS))p(xA|xS)×
log
p(xB |do(xA,xS))∑
x
′
A
p(xB |do(x′A,xS))p(x
′
A|do(xS))
.
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X1 X2
X3
X1 X2
X3
X1 X2
X3
Figure 2: Left: Causal DAG for which it is already non-
trivial to define the strength of the influence ofX1 on X3
– if one demands that this definition should also apply to
the special cases in the middle and on the right.
Here, the distribution p(·|do(xA,xS)) is Pearl’s [6] no-
tation for the interventional probability after setting
XA,XS to xA,xS . Moreover, [12] define also the aver-
age of (36) over all xS :
I(XA → XB |do(XS)) := (37)∑
xS
I(XA → XB |do(xS))p(xS).
Note that I(XA → XB |do(xS)) measures the mu-
tual information of XA and XB when XS is set to xS
and XA is randomized with probability p(XA|do(xS)).
[13] described problems when quantifying the strength of
edges via Information Flow by violations of desirable pos-
tulates. We now argue that we consider it inappropriate as
a measure of total influence in the sense of ‘contribution’
for similar reasons11. We are not claiming that there can-
not be a reasonable way of using the notion of informa-
tion flow for quantifying the contribution of every node
to the information of a target node – we just want to de-
scribe why our attempts of doing so failed. This discus-
sion elaborates on ideas in the appendix of [13]. Consider
the DAG in Figure 2, left. A definition for the influence
of X1 on X3 makes only sense to us if it still holds in
the limiting case where the edge betweenX1 andX2 dis-
appears (Figure 2, middle), and if the arrow X1 → X3
disappears Figure 2, right). This is hard to achieve if one
does not want to give up other strongly desired properties
of causal strength. It is tempting to define the strength of
the influence ofX1 onX3 simply via the information flow
I(X1 → X3), which here coincides with the usual mutual
information I(X1 : X3). Assume we maintain this defi-
nition whenX1 → X2 disappears. For symmetry reasons
11We don’t consider the postulates in [13] because they referred to
strength of edges
we should then also define the strength of the effect ofX2
onX3 by I(X2 → X3). Unfortunately, this admits a sce-
nario where both X1 and X2 have zero influence of X3
although they together have a strong influence onX3: Let
all three variables be binaries attaining 0 and 1 with prob-
ability 1/2 each. Assume X3 is generated from X1 and
X2 via X3 := X1 ⊕ X2. Then every pair of variables is
statistically independent and thus
I(Xj → X3) = I(Xj : X3) = 0 j = 1, 2,
which is disturbing since X1, X2 together determine X3.
Here, information flow fails because it does not account
for the ‘background’ variableX2. For each fixed value of
x2, X1 does have an observable influence on X3, while
the influence gets opaque when we ignore X2. Lead by
this insight, onemay want to define the influence ofX1 on
X3 in Figure 2, middle, by I(X1 → X3 |do(X2)). How-
ever, this blocks the indirect path in Figure 2, left, and ac-
counts only for the direct effect (because adjusting the in-
termediate node turns off the influence that is mediated by
the latter) and even yields zero for Figure 2, right. Hence,
all our attempts of ‘information flow based’ quantifica-
tion of influence of X1 on X3 for the DAG in Figure 2,
left, yield undesired results for the limiting cases shown
in Figure 2, middle and right. From a high-level perspec-
tive, the reason of this failure is that Information Flow
rather formalizes what we described as Opt in Section 2.
Since p(DC |DB) = p(DC |do(DB)) for the three-author
scenario, we have I(DB → DC) = I(DB : DC) =
Opt(B). This suggests that ‘hard interventions’ that ad-
just a variable to fixed, but randomized, values are in-
appropriate for measuring contributions. Other notions of
indirect and path-specific influence [27] that rely on hard
interventions cannot be used for our purpose either.
6.2 Defining strength of causal arrows and
indirect causal influence
[13] stated some properties that they expect from an infor-
mation theoretic quantification of the strength of an arrow
in a general DAG and proposed a measure based on an
operation they called ‘cutting of edges’.
To quantify the information transferred along an ar-
row, [13] think of arrows as channels that propagate in-
formation through space – for instance ‘wires’ that con-
nect electrical devices. To measure the impact of an arrow
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Xj → Xi, they ‘cut’ it and feed it with a random input
that is an i.i.d. copy of Xj . This results in the following
‘post-cutting’ distribution:
Definition 6 (Single arrow post-cutting distribution).
Let G be a causal DAG with nodes X1, . . . , Xn and
PX1,...,Xn be Markovian with respect to G. Further, let
PAji denote the parents of Xi without Xj . Define the
‘post-cutting conditional’ by
pXj→Xi(x|pa
j
i ) :=
∑
xj
p(xi|pa
j
i , xj)p(xj). (38)
Then, the post-cutting distribution PXj→Xi(x1, . . . , xn)
is defined by replacing p(xi|pai) in (1) with (38).
The relative entropy between the observed joint dis-
tribution P (x1, . . . , xn) and the post-cutting distribution
PXi→Xj now measures the strength of the arrow:
Definition 7 (Quantifying strength of an arrow). The
strength of the arrow Xi → Xj is given by
CXi→Xj := D(P‖PXi→Xj ).
Note that the values CY→Z for the DAGs (23) and (27)
coincide, which has even been stated as a Postulate by
[13]. Translated into the scenario in Section 2, the strength
of the edge DB → DC is given by Opt(B). We have ar-
gued that our measure of causal contribution is not sup-
posed to satisfy this property because we explicitly want
to attribute inherited information to the respective ances-
tors.
The idea of feeding conditionals with independent
copies of variables and measuring the KL-distance be-
tween the true distribution and the one resulting from this
randomization is also used for quantifying indirect and
path-specific causal influence in [28]. Note that also these
notions of causal influence have a different intention and
do not distinguish whether the information nodeXi prop-
agates to the target Xj has been inherited from Xi’s par-
ents or generated at the node itself (recall the question of
whether the delay of a train has been caused by waiting for
other delayed trains or by issues related to the train itself).
For the quantification of the influence of the influence pf
Y on Z in (23), indirect influence in [28] coincides with
the strength of the arrowXi → Xj from [13] anyway.
No attribution analysis Although CXi→Xj satisfies all
the Postulates for causal strength stated by [13], it fails in
providing an attribution of causal influence in the sense
desired here. For the simple case of multiple indepen-
dent causes X1, . . . , Xn of Y (Subsection 3.1) one eas-
ily checks CXi→Y = I(Xi : Y |XT\{i}) (which fol-
lows also easily from Theorem 4 in [13]). Although this
makes intuitively sense, the sum of all CXi→Y does not
represent anythingmeaningful. Defining an attribution via
CXi→Y /
∑
j CXj→Y thus lacks conceptual justification.
7 Discussion
We have defined an information-based measure of causal
influence that is lead by quantifying the contribution of
nodes in the sense of what information is added by the
node on top of the information it inherits from its parents.
By discussing other measures of causal influence, we have
argued that quantifying causality raises difficult questions
since different definitions capture different ideas on what
exactly is supposed to be measured. The present paper is
lead by the idea that structure preserving interventions are
particularly helpful to formalize causality in the ‘normal
mode’ as opposed to interventions that involve changes of
the structural equation of the particular node at hand (as,
for instance, the do-operator does).
8 Appendix: Proof of Lemma 3
It is sufficient to show our claim for the case where N˜
contains just one additional element, say n + 1, since the
remaining part follows by induction. When computing ϕ˜i
via a sum over all S˜ ⊂ N˜ we can always merge two cor-
responding terms: one set S not containing n+1 and one
corresponding set S′ := S ∪ {n + 1}. Due to the irrele-
vance of n+ 1 we have
ν˜(S′ ∪ {i})− ν˜(S′)
= ν˜(S ∪ {i})− ν˜(S)
= ν(S ∪ {i})− ν(S),
that is, both terms are the same as for the set S in (8), up to
the combinatorial factors. For the computation of ϕ˜i, the
term with S comes with the factor |S|!(n−|S|)!/(n+1)!,
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while S′ comes with (|S|+ 1)!(n− (|S|)− 1)!/(n+1)!.
The sum of these terms reads
|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!
(n+ 1)!
((n− |S|) + (|S|+ 1))
=
|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!
n!
,
which coincides with the factor in (8).
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